The Libyan constitution, like any other, changes whenever
a new government re-places the previous one. This page will provide information
about the constitution of the Kingdom of Libya (under Idris); the constitution
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (under Gaddafi); and the Constitutional Declaration
of the Interim National Transitional Council (under Abduljalil); and the 2017
Constitution Project of the CDA (Constitution Drafting Assembly). This allows
the reader to compare the various constitutions and see how and if they
change with time.
For example, all three constitutions declared Arabic as the only official
language of Libya despite the fact that Tamazight is the 'native'
language of Libya and not Arabic; but of course the Libyans and their international
friends are yet to handle the bitter truth; replacing one tyranny with another
on the way to "No-where".
As another example, both Gaddafi's
first temporary "Constitutional
Declaration" (adopted on
the 11th of December 1969) and NTC's "Constitutional Declaration" (adopted
on the 3rd of August 2011) had introduced a state of lawlessness. According
to the report of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "the
absence of a constitution facilitated the adoption of contradictory legislation
and undermined protection against human rights violations."
The Constitutional Committee
The Constitutional Committee
Initially the Libyans were told that one of the jobs of the elected National
Congress is to form a 60-member "Constitutional Committee" within 60
days of its election. The constitutional committee will then draft a constitution
for people to vote only in a "yes" or
"no" vote. If the constitution is approved by a majority of two-thirds
or more, then it will be endorsed by the National Congress; if not then it will
be re-drafted by the constitutional committee within 30 days and put back for
another referendum.
However, just two days before the 7/7 elections (of 2012), the NTC shocked
the Libyans, once more, when it stripped the HNEC of its job to form the constitutional
commission. Under the new Constitutional Amendment No. 3 of 2012, issued on
the 5th of July 2012, the constitutional commission is now called "The
Founding Commission",
and it will be elected by Libyan voters directly.
The 60-member commission will
have 120 days from their first meeting to complete and implement the task.
Also the two-thirds majority required to approve the new constitution has now
been amended to "two-thirds plus one". Some sources say the move is dangerous
and may lead to further clashes; while others say it is no more than a temporary
spin to please Cyrenaica and its call for "equal numbers", and that
it will be reversed after the elections had ended.
When January 2013 arrived and still there is no sight of the "draft constitution",
many Libyans began doubting the ability of the GNC to deliver according
to the deadline(s) stipulated by the CD. The delay was due to several reasons
including the safety issue that eventually affected the GNC itself, with repeated
attacks, and according to one GNC member, the amendment made by the NTC on the
5th of July (as mentioned above) was also to blame for the delay.
Passing the
blame from one transitional government to the next, while playing for more
time, allows ample time for "others" to dictate the course of
the events before the law is made; by which time it would become much harder
for people to reverse
the transitional changes established over the interim period(s). Plenty of food
for thought.
Constitutional Consultation
According to Solidarity Press [1],
the GNC's spokesman had announced on the 15th of January 2013 that the GNC
is currently discussing the mechanism to exempt its members from their duties
for two weeks, to allow them the opportunity to return to their hometowns so
that they can enrich and participate in the "social
dialogue" over
the drafting of the constitution to
ensure every voice is heard and forwarded to the general assembly. This without
a doubt is a good step, backwards, towards drafting a constitution that is all
inclusive and fair to "some" fortunate Libyans.
Restructuring The Electoral Commission
On the 9th of February 2013, the GNC announced their
decision to restructure "the Electoral Commission
and its mandate to conduct elections to the Constitutional body”, and to
form "a committee for the preparation of the
electoral law" [2] – a definitive step towards gaining more time.
The announcement came after an earlier vote by 120 GNC members to go along
with the last CD amendment and put the constitutional committee to direct election
– a decision which will be cancelled if refused by the Judicial Authority
[3], in which case the 60 committee will be selected by the GNC itself, and a
decision which will send the process back to square one, to start the process
to "nowhere".
On the 14th of February 2013, the GNC has
approved a three-man committee to draft another electoral law [4]. They are:
Shaban
Buseita (an independent from Nalut, representing Tripolitania)
Suleiman Zubi (an
independent from Benghazi, representing Cyrenaica)
Mohamed Tumi (from Sebha, representing Fezzan)
Sharia Constitution?
On Sunday the 17th of February, during the second anniversary celebration
in Benghazi, Libya's acting president, Dr. Magarief, has "pledged" that
Libya would incorporate Sharia into the forthcoming constitution of Libya [5]. This
seems to be a forced reaction to the earlier statement in which he hinted at
Libya becoming a secular state.
The GNC had decided on the 9th of April 2013 to amend the Constitutional Declaration
in relation to the constitutional committee – the constituent body
in charge of writing the Libyan Draft Constitution. The GNC spokesman, Mr. Omar
Hamidan, told LANA that the committee will be directly elected, and entrusted
with the task of writing the constitution in a "specified period".
He added that the Congress had also amended the previously amended 120-majority
required to pass laws and decrees, which now has been reduced to 100 + 1 (that
is 101 votes are required by the GNC to pass laws).
It is not known why these requirements
keep going up and down, in line with the chaos outside. The Constitutional Amendment
(1) of Year 2012 to Article (30) of the CD has removed the phrase "relative
majority", and instead stated that "in all cases all decisions
shall be taken by a majority of two-thirds" (that is 133 votes
out of 200). But shortly after the election of the GNC, Solidarity Press
announced on the 31st
of August 2012 that the congress had amended
Article (30) of the Constitutional Declaration so that the congress' laws will
be approved by a majority of 120 members. Now this seems to have been reduced
to 101.
New Headquarters: Bayda
02 July 2013:
The GNC had voted on two
articles of the constitutional committee law: article (44), securing a majority
of 133 votes, decides the headquarters of the committee will be in al-Bayda,
in Cyrenaica. Article (44) states that the president and the deputy of the committee
will be decided by
"secret ballot", in a maximum period of two weeks from the date of
announcement of the results.
Electoral Law
16 July 2013:
The GNC had finally approved the electoral law for the
election of the constitutional committee. Out of 60 seats (the actual number
of the members of the committee) only 4 seats were given to the Berbers, 2
seats to the Tebu, and 6 to women. The Berbers say "deleting"
the paragraph relating to the mechanism of the law that ensures "agreement"
(or "compatibility") on cultural and linguistic components of the
society, and instead substituting it with "voting", violates
basic human rights that cannot be voted for. This has angered all the concerned
groups, with the native Berbers and Tebu announcing a boycott of the committee
and the election process, if the GNC does not amend its decision by the 23rd
of July 2013. With only 4 seats the Berbers' hopes continue
to be shattered and circumvented with complicated spin (that is obvious). It
is not known what good this would do to Libya, nor how it relates to the February
revolution, but with the Berbers' boycott, and even their "civil disobedience",
the clock is ticking for the 60-committee to avert alarm. (See Amazigh tab, above
right, for more on this.)
GNC Signs The Constitutional Committee Electoral Law in al-Bayda
20 July 2013:
The GNC held an inauguration ceremony in the old parliament
(of the corrupt monarchy of King Idris) in al-Bayda. The constitutional committee
law was signed by the president of the GNC, Mr. Nuri Abusahmain, before passing
it to the new head of the HNEC, Mr. Nuri al-Abbar - who was re-appointed to the
commission on the 29th of April 2013 by Decree 40/2013. See political
parties for more on election laws and downloads.
Libyan Kingdom Constitution
The constitution was adopted on the 7th of October 1951.
According to the summary report prepared
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph
15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya):
"1. Human Rights Solidarity (HRS)2 reported that
there was no written constitution in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. A temporary "Constitutional
Declaration" was adopted by the Revolutionary Council on 11 December 1969.
On 2 March 1977, the Declaration of the People’s Authority launched a new political
system whose ideals are stipulated in a series of three small booklets known
as the Green Book. HRS added that the absence of a constitution facilitated the
adoption of contradictory legislation and undermined protection against human
rights violations. In the absence of a clear constitution, that defines the branches
of government and regulates the relationship between them -i.e. separation of
powers- security agencies operated with impunity."
On the 3rd of August 2011 the NTC imposed its 37-point "Constitutional
Declaration" (CD) allegedly to provide a framework for the transition
to an elected government, and to call for a constitutional assembly within
eight months. Even though the CD is written for the transitional period the
draft had attracted strong criticism from both Berbers and Arabs including
secular Libyans, women groups, exiled Libyans, and human rights organisations
and activists for a number of reasons outlined as follows:
The Constitutional Declaration was imposed by the NTC without any consultation
with the Libyan People and without a referendum, Libyans say.
The Constitutional Declaration "seems to have been influenced
by transition planning advice from the UN as well as the US and UK", The
Guardian said.
The Constitutional Declaration seems to have been designed to effect an ethnic
conflict; dictating Arabic as the only official language
while excluding
Berber and Tebu languages. It would have been more appropriate if the NTC had
organised a public referendum
after the presumed liberation, rather than dictate its own opinion before
liberation.
Both Gaddafi's first temporary "Constitutional Declaration" (adopted on
the 11th of December 1969) and the NTC's "Constitutional Declaration" (adopted
on the 3rd of August 2011) had introduced a state of lawlessness. According to
the report of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "the absence of
a constitution facilitated the adoption of contradictory legislation and undermined
protection against human rights violations."
Introducing
Constitutional Declarations during the transition seems to
allow interim leaders ample time to lay the rules and pave the way for the kind
of change they see in mind (usually chaos and corruption), long before the elections
take place and long before the new constitution is written; by which time everything
becomes established and the euphoria of "regime-change" slowly
disappears whence it came. This leads one to enquire if "constitutional
declarations" were
invented to effect change in the absence of law! Instead, one is better inclined
to leave both the security apparatus and the previous constitution as they are,
effective and valid during the transitional period, just as the old currency
stays (and just as the old business contracts are honoured), until the new constitution
is discussed first, written by qualified experts (without any foreign advice),
voted for (or even better: agreed upon), and then adopted by the people of Libya.
Far less damage to the structure of the country will be done this way. This method,
which most leaders appear unable to favour, is also less costly, more effective,
saves lives, protects civilians, eliminates tension and revenge, and thus speeds
recovery.
In its introduction to the CD the NTC said that "in
response to the desire and the expectation of the Libyan people to achieve democracy
. . . the NTC issued this Constitutional Declaration to become the foundation
of governance during the transition." What does
"in response to the desire and the expectation of the Libyan people" mean?
The CD was imposed on the Libyan people without any consultation or discussion
with the Libyan people. No one has consulted the Berber people of Libya about
their 'desires' and 'expectations' regarding 'democracy', 'equality' and 'official
recognition'. The CD is written in response to the desires of the NTC or in response
to the desires of the people who wrote the CD -- for example, as was mentioned
above, the CD seems to have been influenced by transition planning advice from
the West. There was no referendum held in relation to the 37-points dictated
by the NTC in its CD, and in fact many Libyans, Berbers and Arabs alike, have
objected to a number of points, and even protested against the CD in the streets
of the capital after liberation, but no one took any notice of their 'desires'
and 'expectations'.
According to the report published
by democracy-reporting.org, "The Constitutional Declaration appears
to envisage a significant law-making role for the ITNC that goes beyond the immediate
necessities of the transition. This could raise concerns if the ITNC is seen
to pre-empt fundamental, substantive choices regarding Libya’s State and society,
which should be left to the democratically elected bodies to decide at a later
date."
The "Constitutional Declaration" of the NTC
seems to violate itself by having Article
(6) contradict Article (1). Article (6) states that Libyans are 'equal'
before the law, and 'they are equal' to enjoy civil and political rights
without any discrimination based on religion, confession (or sect), language,
wealth, kinship, gender, political opinion, social status, or tribal or familial
belonging. But Article (1) declares only Arabic as the official language of Libya,
despite the fact that Berber is the 'native' language of Libya and not
Arabic. If all Libyans are 'equal' and have 'equal rights' regardless of language,
then Berber language must equally be made official. If not, then they are not
equal, as Article (6) claims they are.
Article (1)
Translation:
"Libya is an independent and democratic country, in it people are
the source of power, its capital is Tripoli, its religion is Islam, Islamic Sharia
is its primary source of legislation, and the country pledges the freedom to
practice religious ceremonies for non-Muslims, and its
official language is The Arabic Language, and the country Libya guarantees
the cultural rights for all the components of the Libyan society and their languages
are considered national languages."
The NTC's response to the Berbers' criticism was that people
need to be patient, and that a 'constitutional committee' will draft
the final constitution and and put to a referendum for the Libyan
people to vote for only in a "yes" or "no" vote.
According to the Berber people of Libya, if the CD was temporary and that they
need to wait for the final copy to see the fruits of the 'spring', then why publish
the temporary CD in the first place? The Berbers have also said that identity
issues and justice are not matters for voters to decide in a 'yes' or 'no' vote,
but they are basic human rights -- automatically granted to the ruling party
but not to all Libyans 'equally'. It is obvious that the majority was terrorising
the minorities under the pretext of tyranny and dictatorship in the past, and
the whole point of revolution and democracy is to allow minorities equal rights
to breathe freedom and enjoy dignity without having to beg the majority for what
is their divine right by birth. Only time will reveal Libya's Third Constitution
in as many governments, and until then the Berbers still hope for "just" constitution
and one that is different from the previous two.
Article 30 and its first amendment state that the constitution
will be endorsed if two-thirds of Libyans vote for it. This requirement risks
the failure of the referendum if this majority is not reached. According to democracy-reporting.org, "Curiously,
article 30 requires the constitution to be approved by the Constituent Power
and the NPC after it is approved by popular referendum".
Article (7) says "the country" will respect 'human
rights' and the 'political freedom' of Libyans, but it does not say what this
means in practice. Denying the Berbers 'official recognition' and the right to
form 'political parties' based on identity could only mean violations of both:
human rights and political freedom. The CD needs to be specific regarding these
issues and face the challenges ahead without playing with words. Human rights
are not "respected", "tolerated" or "voted", but
they are natural rights recognised and endorsed by the constitution.
Article (1) states "Sharia" as the primary
source of legislation, while at the same time states that 'people are the
source of power’. Is it people or Sharia the source of power? As reported by Democracy Reporting, the CD does not say
which schools of Sharia will be applied and which body is in charge of interpreting
or applying Sharia principles!
The NTC introduced 'Sharia' and 'Arabic language' in its CD without
any consultation with the Libyan people. Moreover, in July 2012, the NTC published its manifesto Number
7 (of 2012) in which they "reminded" the General National
Congress that Sharia is "not for voting".
Article (1) also states 'Islam' is the religion of Libya, while
at the same time pledges freedom for non-Muslims to practice their religion.
The phrase
"non-Muslims" (in Article 1) is ambiguous and could refer
to both Libyans and non-Libyans, in the same way "their religion" could
mean any other religion in the world. All in all, there are "thousands of
religions" in the world. Would this mean that Libyans and non-Libyans can
practice any religion they like in the world? The CD needs to be concise rather
than use broader terms that can be left wide-open to misinterpretations.
Article (14) guarantees the freedom of "scientific research"
as long as it does not contradict with the law. But then what does the law say
in relation to scientific research? Which part of science that is against the
law and which part that is not? Is Darwinian research against the law? Is secular
research permitted? The CD needs to grant Libyans an absolute freedom of scientific
research, simply because research can not harm the law: research is information
-- the search for scientific truth. How can the quest for scientific truth
contradict the law in any way? The proper and final "Constitution" needs
to address these issues with clear 'wording'.
Article (6): Libyan women politicians and activists have been
campaigning for some time against the apparent violation by the election committee
(or election officials) of Article (6) of the CD, which calls for equal opportunities
and rights for women. Some women stated that there is an apparent program to
obstruct women from achieving reasonable presence in the government and its various
programs and institutions, and that the election committee had failed to ensure
that all procedures are in line with the guidelines specified by the CD. The
number of women GNC-members was said to be 40 women, making exactly 20% of the
total (of 200 members).
According to Democracy Reporting, "The right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion as protected under article 18 of ICCPR is
missing from the Constitutional Declaration7, and this again raises concerns
in view of the principles contained in article 1. Moreover, while some elements
of freedom of expression are reflected in article 14, it falls short of providing
adequate protection in line with article 19 of the ICCPR,8 which includes in
particular the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers...”
On the 9th of February 2013, nearly 8 months after the election
of the GNC, the president of the GNC, Dr.
Magarief, has announced
that
the Constitutional
Declaration (CD) did not clearly define the duties of the General National Conference (GNC) and the Executive
Department. No doubt there are a number of limitations, gaps
and contradictions within the CD that are in direct contradiction
with the aspirations and the principles of the "revolution" (to many
categories of people, at least);
yet only now the leaders are acknowledging one or two limitations whilst
continuing to ignore the remaining violations. The
fact that the GNC and the PMO had several disagreements regarding a number of
issues resulting from this particular issue, and given the fact that the GNC
had faced great difficulties to represent "authority",
the blame can only lie at the heart of the CD. Hence, the question: why write
the CD in the manner it was written or advised when it was not necessary at all
(at that early stage)?
Could it be a catalyst for civil conflict the leaders
are yet to configure?
Why stir more trouble before putting out the fires still taking place, before
healing the wounded, and before cleaning the mess and re-building the destroyed
country? Believe it or leave it, the CD was dictated
long before liberation was presumed. The CD was declared on the 3rd
of August 2011, and Liberation was prematurely presumed on the
23rd of October 2011 (while the country still was in a state of war). Why the
hurry?
Historical leaders are those who always seem to know what
is best for their country, and loyal citizens are those who accept nothing less.
If the Constitutional Declaration was imposed without any consultation with
the Libyan people, while flawed with contradictions, vague definitions and minority-rights
violations, then it may provide fertile grounds for questioning its authority
in relation to 'democracy', 'transparency', 'equality', 'freedom' and 'legitimacy';
and as such one would expect all resulting decisions to follow the same line
of enquiry.
The best measure for the CD's controversy is the fact that it
is continually being amended whenever anyone is not happy with any
particular article. So far 8 amendments have been imposed on the Libyan people,
with more currently being discussed by the HoR to accommodate the UN-imposed
GNA; achieving nothing more
than effecting chaos and corruption, and infecting the country with terror
and poverty; clearly illustrating the third observation
made above.
Lets us hope the permanent
constitution is agreed upon on time to address all the above issues before
it is too late.
التعديل الدستوري رقم 8
Download The Constitutional Declaration Amendment (8) of 2014, in Arabic:
House of Representatives' decree amending Article 34 of the February Commission
Constitutional Amendment Proposal: Constitutional
Declaration Amendment 8 of Year 2014
Download The Constitutional Declaration Amendment (8) of 2014, in English:
full translation provided by temehu.com for informational purposes only: Constitutional
Declaration Amendment 8 of Year 2014
Finally, the hidden objective of the UN bombing campaign began to loom over the horizon: dividing Libya into three countries. The constitutional amendment number 10 amends clause 12 of Article 30 of the CD. This amendment was reported to have been approved by the HoR on the 26th of November 2018, allegedly, by 123 MPs.
This amendment divides Libya into three voting districts: the old colonial Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. This they said is required by the referendum law whose article 6 contradicts the NTC-imposed CD.
The amendment also states that if two-thirds of Libyans vote with yes then the permanent constitution will be adopted so long as the percentage of yes votes is more than 50% (that is a minimum of 50% + 1 is required).
The second article of the amendment states that the constitution project will be rejected if it does not meet all the above conditions; while the third article makes this latest saga effective from the date of publication: 26/11/2018.
Violations:
The HoR session to vote over and pass these latest amendments was not televised as usual and therefore critics say there was no evidence that the alleged numbers announced by the HoR are correct (see below for more on this issue).
Some critics questioned the legitimacy of the session by saying it is unusual that many members of the HoR have met over this amendment despite the lack of such attendance during the previous years [1].
Some critics have already reported that 120 members of the HoR are loyal to Tripoli's Brotherhood and that the HoR and the HCS (and thus the PC) are working together to ensure the Brotherhood takeover of Libya [2].
According to the HoR MP Hamoudda Sayala, the amendment to immunise Article 6 of the referendum law violates the elementary standards of the equality of citizens. According to Libya Observer, Mr. Sayala said: "There is no such thing as constitutional immunity of a law, either the article is part of a law or a constitutional article, which both must be approved by specific voting mechanisms" [3].
The draft constitution was announced on the 29th of July 2017. Most Libyans rejected the draft outright for its blatant violations of basic human rights; and yet the authorities kept silent ever since (16 months). Now it is almost certain these violations will remain so for [some] people to vote on.
Many Berberists have protested about both the procedure and the draft itself for years but, as usual, no one is interested in dispensing justice for the marginalised natives of Libya.
This means that the two-third majority stipulated by the HoR will be mainly Arab majority because the native Berbers have already boycotted this mysterious process, as reported under the above Amazigh tab (in the green menu bar).
The number of Libyans was a mere 4 million when the February Operation began. Now it is reported that millions of foreigners were given fake Libyan IDs by the authorities in Tripoli for the sole purpose of voting (as reported elsewhere). This means that it is doubtful if any voting operation in Libya can be considered transparent from now on; and in fact none were in the past either, as reported in our GNC page (under the 7/7 Elections tab).
The second amendment (also passed on the same day) approves the amendment to the UN-imposed LPA as agreed (without saying what this agreement was) and includes this amendment in the Constitutional Declaration (CD).
The amendment states that the restructured PC will include only three members: one president and two deputies, plus a separate prime minister.
The second article states that this amendment is effective from the 26th of November 2018.
Violations:
The HoR had previously refused to approve the UN-imposed PC and its head the UN-imposed Fayez Serraj, even though the HoR was happy to negotiate with both the PC and the HCS ever since.
Despite the illegal formation of the PC's HCS (in violation of the CD) the HoR now violates its own house rules by sharing its legislative powers with an illegal body.
According to a statement made by the illegal HCS the CD Amendments 10 and 11 are not in accord with (or contradict) Article 12 of the Additional Provisions of the [UN-imposed] Libyan
Political Agreement (LPA) [7]. The PC's spokesman, Mr. el-Sallak, was also reported to have said that the referendum law recently proposed by the HoR is not in accord with the LPA and thus would immune the constitution referendum from any appeals [8]. This confirms that the next elections would probably lead to further discord, if not a third government as predicted by many Libyan analysts to be the hidden objective of the whole UN saga.
Critics also say that the latest amendment does not cover a fraction of the UN-imposed LPA as was required ever since December 2015 (when it was first imposed by the UN). According to HoR member Mesbah Douma the HoR did not fortify the entire LPA in the Constitutional Declaration [4]:
قال عضو مجلس النواب عن سبها، مصباح دومة، إن المجلس لم يعتمد الاتفاق السياسي كاملا في الإعلان الدستوري
According to Nadia Omran (CDA member herself) it has not been determined yet how many members had attended the session and therefore one is unable to conclude the legitimacy of the session [1].
According to 218tv.net the number of attended members was reported to have been 94, which is short of the 120 majority required by law [5]. The same source also states that according to the president of the HoR 119 members have attended the session, and out of these 118 agreed to the amendments and therefore this figure is more than the 115 majority required by law [5].
The president was also reported to have advised his critics to return to the judicial court for a decision if they are not happy with the results! Presumably the same judicial court that previously ruled the HoR being an illegal body?
It must be noted that two-thirds of 200 members is 133; while removing the boycotted members (the persecuted natives: the Berbers and the Tebu) as well as Derna's members then the figure reduces to 125 (that is 2/3 of 188). Legally speaking other members who resigned or withdraw after the initial formation must be replaced in order to preserve the required majority by law. Even the resigned (or/and boycotting) PC members are yet to be replaced.
In short it is evident that the authorities (together with their international friends) continue to impose further violations to extend the agony initially imposed on Libyans by the UN.
All transitional governments, so far, appear quite silent about the specific
issue of "constitutionalising Tamazight". This led the Berbers to protest
against the NTC and the GNC (and their various transitional governments) for
what they say their apparent approval of the marginalisation policy employed
by the Ousted.
No official reference to constitutionalising Tamazight was made anywhere
by any Libyan official; and instead the leaders appear tweaking statistics and
terms to win their way through hasty elections and bungled decrees passed by
transitional governments before even writing a constitution. The Berbers are
aware of such un-transparent methods to deprive them of the fruits of the "February
Revolution" they were led to believe they fought for (when their services
were still required to topple the Ousted).
They were used and let down before, since 1911, and now in 2011 when the Constitutional
Declaration once again failed to mention the Berbers by "name"; then
on July 2013 when the 60-Committee Law was amended then passed with fundamental
violations of human rights just as violated by the Ousted.
Why The Arabs Say Tamazight Can Never Be Constitutionalised?
There are various reasons explaining why the majority of the
Arabs were kept in darkness regarding Tamazight, and these require a dedicated study of their own. However, the most important reasons are the government's
silence to address the Berber issue by name (apart from the misleading "ethnic
minorities")
and the lack of any serious media debates over the Berber issue. Some Arabs openly
say that constitutionalising Tamazight will force the government to develop extra
systems to implement official procedures in Berber language, like having to
appoint a Berber spokesman in every government department; prepare its staff
to accept legal proceedings submitted in Tamazight; and appoint Berber translators,
lawyers and prosecutors in every court house.
These are somewhat exaggerated fears, since they do not have to be that way.
These are issues left to resolve once the process is declared open to discussion.
Some even declared the minority 10% Berbers can never force such policies
on the majority 90% Arabs. Such views also say that 90% of Berbers cannot read
or write Tamazight, while nearly all Berbers can read and write Arabic; but,
of course, this situation came about as a result of the long persecution and
marginalisation the Berbers needlessly endured through the centuries, just as
they were deprived by law of the legal authority and the financial funds required
to revive and develop their language in education, literature and the media.
Within a few generations of such freedom (if granted) those Arabs who cite
such statistics can be assured that 100% of Berbers will be able to read and
write Tamazight - unless Arabic is forced by law (as it is now and then). In
fact this is exactly what the Berbers are saying: constitutionalising Tamazight
does not mean imposing Berber language on all Arabs, nor Arabic on all Berbers.
It seems plausible that confusion was intentionally created to distance people
from the simple truth, in the same way federalism was falsely associated with
dividing Libya when it is merely concerned with decentralisation of administration.
Such
"advice" implemented by the current transitional government would therefore
appear to create deep divisions within the so-called
"liberated Libyans".
The Report of Libya al-Hurra TV (قناة
ليبيا الحرة )
The Forum of the Constitutional Rights for the Imazighen of Libya, Tripoli.
The forum was held on the 12th of January 2013, at the Rixos Hotel, Tripoli
- just one day before the unofficial Berber New Year (13 January 2963). The new
year is celebrated as a public holiday by the Berbers of Libya, even though they
still campaign for the event to be declared "official holiday".
The constitutional forum was attended by a number of GNC members including
Libya's acting president, Dr. Magarief, and Berber GNC members, the deputy minister
of culture, the president of the World Amazigh Congress, representatives from
various political parties including the heads of the NFA and the Justice &
Development party, representatives from a number of embassies, the European Union
and the UN, Berberists from Egypt and Tunisia, and hundreds of Libyan Berbers
and Arabs as well as the MEDIA - the vital component the Berbers lack to propel
their struggle for dignity and freedom.
The Berber representative of the Berber-speaking areas in Libya called for
the establishment of "The Supreme Council for the Amazigh of Libya",
to represent a united front to assist the Berbers to achieve their goals and
legitimate aspirations.
The Berbers have made it clear that they will never accept any constitution
that does not include "justice", "equality" and "complete
citizenship"; and that their constitutional rights are not subject to "voting", "differentiation"
or "referendum" because they are legitimate rights for all Libyans
regardless of gender, colour, language or doctrine.
Dr. Magarief has, once more, demonstrated his wholehearted support for Tamazight
('Berber language') to be constitutionally recognised, and stressed
his personal belief that there is a unanimous agreement among Libyans that the
Imazighen and the Tebu together with the Arabs form a fundamental component of
the Libyan society.
The Deputy Culture Minister, Atwater Utahan, has also expressed support for
Tamazight to be recognised by the constitution, and stated that the Berbers'
right is not only a political right but also a "legal", "cultural" and "historical"
right. Hopefully the ministry's website will mention Libya's indigenous culture
by "name", instead of the usual marginalisation displayed by most government
and private institutions.
The Recommendations Outlined By The Forum
The commanding speech of the president
of Zuwarah's Local Council, Dr. Tariq Attoshi.
The Final statement of the Constitutional Rights Forum for the Amazigh of
Libya was authoritative, straightforward, and clear about the Berbers' demands
for freedom, equality and dignity. The speech was delivered by the president
of Zuwarah's Local Council, Dr. Tariq Attoshi, on behalf of all the heads of
the local councils of Tamazight-speaking communities of Libya, and on behalf
of the Berber members of the GNC. In declaring the establishment of the Supreme
Council for the Amazigh of Libya, Dr. Tariq recommends the following:
The Constitution ought to categorically respond to the "spirit" of
the Libyan revolution, and aim to prepare the nation from the "state
of exclusion & marginalisation"
to a "state of equality for all citizens", in all rights
and duties; the state of true democracy, human rights and the rule of law; the
state of freedom, dignity and social justice embodied by the slogan: "for
a democratic constitution, in both form and substance".
The Constitution ought to categorically acknowledge the "Libyan
identity" as the "identity of the State of Libya",
rooted in its Tamazight heritage; with the commitment to include its features
in all official emblems and sovereign symbols, such as the currency, identity
cards, the national anthem, postal stamps, educational curriculum, and
the media.
The Constitution ought to categorically recognise Tamazight
as an official language of Libya, and an equal language with other official languages.
The Constitution ought to develop a "regulatory law",
to organise the introduction of Tamazight to all areas of public life,
to ensure legal protection, and to activate Tamazight as an official language.
The Constitution ought to reinstate the legal right for the Ibadi doctrine (للمذهب
الإباضي to exercise its authority legislatively, ceremonially, scientifically
and through the media.
Reflections > Education
This without a doubt signals a historical step forward; and the fact that
government representatives and international organisations had finally began
to respond to the Berbers pleas to join the debate is a great victory the patient
Berbers are proud to achieve. But the government needs to do more than express
sympathy unofficially.
A quick glance at social media reveals widespread belief amongst many Arab
Libyans to oppose the Berber reforms for "freedom", "equality" and "justice".
No doubt these people are excused, not so much for their naivety, but from the
total black-out imposed by the ousted media and the previous Education Ministry
regarding Libya's Berber heritage and culture.
The NTC and el-Keib's government have both failed to educate the Libyan people
about the "Berbers", just as they have failed to educate the country
about their complicated electoral system and the promised democratic transition
they claimed to introduce. They even made statements that infuriated the Berbers,
as if the objective was to trigger tribal confrontation rather than reap reconciliation
during those critical moments when Libya needed nothing but unity.
One can only hope the honourable GNC fulfils the promised aspirations of
the people and oust "discrimination" as they did say "tyranny".
In order for the new leaders to ensure national reconciliation, they "must" educate
the Libyans through regular TV and Radio programs and fund debates about the
native "Berbers" and encourage them to be proud-of rather than
"hate" their history and indigenous identity.
In order for the government to fulfil the principles of the (so-far-presumed)
revolution, they need to expel, once and for all, the stigmatisation the Imazighen
of Libya still suffer in the name of "revolutions" - coming and going
as a matter of novelty without them ever being fully included.
The 60-Committee's Member Allocation: 48 versus 12:
In his first interview as GNC leader, Mr. Abu-Sahmain ('of-the-two-arrows')
was reported to have said that he is a Libyan, an Amazigh, an Arab, and a Muslim,
leaving some Berber critics to wonder if the president had crossed the line just
to emphasise the need for national reconciliation where one can be both: an Arab
and a Berber at the same time.
The alarming behaviour of the NFA and the JCP immediately afterwards, namely
freezing their activities at the GNC, brings some questions to mind. For example,
it is widely reported that it was the Islamist block in the GNC that decided
victory for the Berber leader of the GNC, Nuri Abusahmain, in the second round,
and if so, why did they vote a Berber leader for the GNC and then freeze or limit
their GNC activity a week or so later?
Such group activity could only weaken the injured GNC, while for the record
grants them the opportunity to distance themselves from the failure (they helped
effect, by not staying united and strong); for which the Berbers may eventually
get the blame!
The second twist is far more intriguing. A few weeks later, the
GNC finally approved the electoral law for the election of the 60-committee,
whose job is to write the draft constitution. Initially, some Berber sources
said it was agreed to elect the members of the 60 committee without emphasis
on proportional representation on the condition that cultural rights are agreed
upon before hand; but after passing the law this was not included in the approved
law.
(1) - Boycott:
With only 4 seats given to the Berbers (out of 60), 2 seats for the Tebu,
and 6 for women, the immediate reaction of Berber and Tebu leaders was their
sudden announcement that they will withdraw their members from the GNC and boycott
the constitutional committee elections. From this violation, the indigenous protesters
have a valid point, mainly the "deleting"
of the paragraph relating to the mechanism of the election law that ensures "agreement"
(or "compatibility") on cultural and linguistic components of the
society, rather than voting. Given the fact that all laws passed via voting must
secure (the-ever-changing) majority, the indigenous groups and Libya's "women"
say they will have no say with just 12 votes between all of them. The catalysts
for anger was ignited for the Berbers to get ready for integration or else the
blame begins to beacon, as intended by the masters!
(2) - Civil Disobedience:
A few days later, the Berber activists even gave the government until Tuesday
(23 July 2013) to amend its 60-committee law, or else they will go into "civil
disobedience"; knowing quite well what that might entail in the long
run for the Berbers themselves - what experts call
"tail-spin". The same thing has already happened to the Berber
Tuareg of the Sahara during the countless rebellions of the past decades; just
as it is happening now in Berber Azawad (in the same month: July 2013), where
the Berbers found themselves protesting against what they say is nothing more
than another bungled election in the making. After the breaking-fast blasts in
Benghazi on the 28th of July 2013 (the anniversary of the assassination of General
Abdulfattah Younis), Libya.tv reported a number of people from Benghazi calling
for "civil disobedience".
The Amazigh Supreme Council Says The Berbers Will Boycott The Constitutional
Vote
What is strange about the whole thing is that the media (including
the best of the Western media) reported the incident with incorrect terms and
in violation of basic rules of linguistic and anthropology. For example,
Reuters wrote:
"Three Libyan ethnic minorities announced on Wednesday they would boycott
an election of a committee to draft a new constitution".
The incorrect "three ethnic minorities" phrase (meaning
Berbers, Tuareg and Tebu) was repeated across the world and across Libya. Why
are the Tuareg and the Berbers often mentioned as two ethnic minorities when
they are one indigenous Berber group?
Strange, one might say; but then there is the bigger question of why mislabel "indigenous
people" by degrading them to an "ethnic minority"?
Why generalise the actions of some politicians on the whole community? This is
like considering Londoners a distinct ethnic minority that is not English, in
as much as generalising the actions of some Londoners on the whole English community.
Zuwarah: protest insignia stating "we will not return to slavery [chains]".
The Berbers have been saying for nearly two years now that they are the natives of Libya and not an ethnic minority, let alone the absured "cultural component", as if they were a cog in a broken wheel. The Tuareg are also Berbers; the Kabyles are Berbers; the Zuwarans are Berbers; the Shiloh are Berbers; the Gouaches are Berbers; the Nasamons are Berbers; the Temehu are Berbers; and there are around 40 major Berber groups currently persecuted across 10 North African countries --- not counting the hundreds of smaller tribes and clans who are also Berbers. All these groups speak one language: "Tamazight".
Therefore the
Ousted Colonel was right to say "there are no ethnic minorities in Libya", because all the tribes of Libya are members of the Libyan society including the Arabs, regardless of number, regardless of gender, regardless of colour,
regardless of "ethnicity" (Arab, Berber or Tebu), and regardless of
age, status, "pocket", or any other characteristic feature that distinguishes
one Libyan from another.
What sort of justice depriving the native Libyans of their basic & advanced rights while subjecting them to the laws of "minorities" imposed by the majority with full foreign support? Why cannot the laws of minorities and majorities be the same regardless of number, colour or gender?
Are not we all supposed to be humans with full human rights (as claimed by the hijacked UN)? Since when ganging up in large numbers under the cloak of "democracy" secures basic human rights?
The Statement of Northern Berbers, Tuareg Berbers, And Tebu Regarding
The Electoral Law of The Constitutional Committee
17 July 2013:
The statement was delivered today in a press conference held
at the Rixos Hotel, Tripoli. The names of the three Berber representatives are:
The Supreme Council for the Amazigh of Libya: Mr. Nouri al-Sherwi (المجـــــــلس
الأعلى لأمازيغ ليبيا السيد نورى الشروى)
Tebawi National Gathering: Mr. Adam Ali Rami (التـــــــــــــــجمع الوطنى
التباوى السيد ادم على رامى)
Tuareg Supreme Council: Mr. Mohammad Ramadan Sidi Omar (المجــــــــــــلس الأعلى
للطوارق السيد محمد رمضان سيدى عمر)
The statement declares the following measures:
Boycotting the constitutional committee.
Suspending GNC membership of Berber, Tuareg (also Berbers, by the way), and
Tebu members.
Urging the GNC to apply the provisions stipulated in the international conventions
concerning minorities.
Allow the GNC until the 23rd of July 2013 to amend the constitutional declaration,
before the Berbers and the Tebu "enter civil disobedience";
the consequences of which will be the responsibility of the GNC.
Berber revolutionaries, dignitaries and civil society organisations were reported
to have backed the boycott.
Ajdabiya's GNC member denies that Berber GNC members had submitted their resignations
According
to LANA, on the 25th of July 2013 Ajdabiya's GNC member, Mr. Sharif Alwafi,
had denied the resignation of any of the Berber GNC members, when he told the
news agency that no resignations were submitted to the GNC. There was no official
announcement neither from the GNC nor from Libyan official media confirming the
resignation of any of the Berber members.
This is a big problem currently flourishing in Libya, where people circulate
the same piece of information without providing valid references. However, Solidarity Press did say that the Amazigh member at the GNC, Shaaban Abusetta, said that
the Berber members "will submit their resignations", but he
never confirmed that they had already done so.
However, Mr. Sharif, like all other Arab members of the GNC, had avoided the
mention of Tamazight in relation to the forbidden word: "constitution",
while iterating the popular belief that the Berbers' cultural rights will be
respected. Once again, the Berbers are not talking about the use of their language
or culture (since they have been doing so for tens of thousands of years), but
simply they are specifically talking about constitutional recognition, which
no GNC member nor any other government official had the courage to address in
the open by name (without dodging the word or replacing it with
"minority" or "component").
The only GNC member who specifically used the forbidden word is Dr. Magarief,
when he attended the Amazigh Constitutional Forum in January 2013 - even though
the event was off the record, on the side, and as he put it, he was merely expressing
his personal opinion.
اعتصام امازيغ مدينة زواره بسبب قانون انتخابات الهيئه التاسيسية لصياغه الدستور
According to Abdulaziz Shelghem, from Zuwara, the Libyans rebelled against
Gaddafi for justice and equality and yet one still sees the GNC coming against
the principles of the 17th of February revolution. What February revolution are
they talking about, he asked? He stressed the fact that the Berbers are from
this "earth", and all they hope for is justice, without resorting to
violence and without having any separatist tendencies.
What Does "Civil Disobedience" Mean?
24 July 2013:
The civil disobedience was reported by Solidarity
Press to have began on the 24th of July 2013, at 08:00 HH. According to Berber sources the disobedience includes the following
actions:
Boycott the constitutional committee elections
Refuse to recognise the authority of the constitutional committee
Close all government offices and services
Close all commercial shops
Close essential roads, seaports and land borders (including Ras Ajdir, Wazen,
Dhiba, Zuwara Seaport, coastal road)
Close factories
Close oil fields
Close schools
Lower the Libyan flag
However, two days after the civil disobedience began, Solidarity and LANA
had reported that both borders at Wazen and Ras Ajdir are working and open for
business as usual; while Libya.tv reported that Berber protesters had closed
a pipeline supplying the Mellitah Gas complex.
Think
Why write such unjust declarations, laws and manifestoes in the first place
at this difficult stage?
Why provoke people with atrocities and labels of "foreign agendas" when
they still were healing their deepest wounds?
Why lack of security, police and Army to this day?
Why leave Libya's borders in disarray and free for criminals at this crucial
stage?
Why are the free and liberated Libyans still being assassinated and bombed
almost every single day?
The Berbers were dragged into violence before (several times - right from
1911 and down to 2011) only to be let down afterwards. Most Berbers see it in
simple terms, and that is regardless of what politicians plot in the background
it is always the poor people who end up fighting each other.
Should the Berbers swallow the bait and respond as expected from them: fight
each other and destroy whatever is left? No.
Most Berbers abhor violence and are shocked by the scale of destruction still
grinding the Libyan society before their eyes, let alone agree to any of it.
The Berbers and Arabs too are flabbergasted by the scale of terrorism thriving
in Libya today. Like Dr. Magarief had said, do not be pawns on others' chessboard.
Violence is not the answer.
Just take a good look around you, wonder at the tension being pillowed
to the heavens, and you will see the answer written in smoke across the "clear" sky.
Berber Constitution Update (1)
Law 18 (2013): On The Rights of Cultural & Linguistic Components
of The Libyan People.
Issued by the GNC (General National Congress).
Date: 30 July 2013.
Download the full Law 18 (2013): https://www.temehu.com/GNC/law-18-2013-rights-of-cultural-linguistic-components-of-libya.pdf
Temehu.com's translation of Law 18 (2013):
Article (1):
The language[s] of the Berbers, the Tuareg and the Tebu are considered part
of the linguistic and cultural components of the Libyan society.
Article (2):
All linguistic and cultural components have the right to learn their language
as an optional subject in the educational curriculum in accordance with the law
in the schools located in "their indigenous areas" and others.
Article (3):
The Minister of Education needs to provide the required books, teachers and
all the necessary means to implement this law.
Article (4):
The Culture Ministry will be responsible for coordinating with the local town
councils to organise annual or seasonal festivals to "revive"
the cultural heritage of the components mentioned in Article (1).
Article (5):
The Culture Ministry will be responsible for establishing and developing research
and historical centres to supervise the preservation of the cultural and linguistic
identity of the Berbers, (the Tuareg), and the Tebu; as well as for protecting,
"originating", developing and publishing the cultural and linguistic
heritage of "these components".
Article (6):
All related authorities must take all the necessary procedures required to
implement this law.
Article (7):
This law is effective from the date of its publication; and cancels all other
contradicting laws; and must be published in the "official newspaper".
The General National Congress - Libya
[End of translation.]
Notes:
Tuareg language is also a Berber language. For some reason or another,
the Libyan government and the world's media still afraid to mention the various
Berber tribes as one single, indigenous power.
The use of the term
"considered" (in Article 1) to describe the native people
of Libya is indignifying, suggesting the Berbers "are" not
Libyans, but only a "considered" component, else
known as minority.
What is wrong with saying: "Berber is one of the cultural components
of Libya"?
Or even better, is the indigenous component of Libya.
Why only the Arabic component automatically acquires an official status and
constitutional recognition?
Why does the media refer to the "Amazigh"
and the "Tuareg" as two different ethnic components of Libya when everyone knows
both are Berbers?
Aren't all the Libyan components supposed to be "Libyan components" equal
before the same libyan law?
It is a good gesture from the GNC to appoint the ministry of culture to "preserve" the
heritage of the Berber component, but it is the Berbers themselves who have been
responsible for the preservation of their persecuted identity, alone, for thousands
of years. Only constitutional recognition can guarantee the required protection.
The Mourning Day ('As N Tkerkas'): 20 February 2014:
Photo source: Zuwarah Media Centre: https://www.facebook.com/zuwara.mc
Berber protesters took to the streets of Zuwarah on what they
called the "mourning day" to protest against what the Amazigh
council called "fake elections", or in Tamazight
"as n tkerkas" ('the day of lies'). One of the slogans chanted
during the march is : “we
will not recognise those who do not recognise us”, and hence the protest
is named: "we will take our rights". In defiance of
the official holiday declared by the government, the 20th of February 2014
was declared by Zuwarah's local council an ordinary day, with schools and institutions
open for business as usual.
The protest was organised by the Azref Movement and
Zuwarah Local Council. On the previous day the Amazigh Supreme Council
declared its rejection of the Constitutional Committee, and instead announced
its own decision to hold its own elections for a Berber parliament, without providing
any details.
The Berbers (including the Tuareg of the Sahara) have boycotted
the elections for the following reasons:
Tamazight language should be officially recognised by the constitution without
the need for voting because legitimate rights cannot be voted for.
The constitution should be a matter of consensus (agreement) and not a matter
of voting. The Berbers say no constitution can be written without an agreement.
The GNC refused to amend Article (30) of the Constitutional Declaration
accordingly.
Assuming the Berbers have no option but to accept the voting principle to
write the constitution, the four seats allocated to the Berbers (2 for the northern
Berbers and 2 for the Berbers of the Sahara) are not enough to represent the
native Berber community of Libya. If it comes to voting (within the 60 committee)
the Berbers say they will have no voice to effect any change but to accept defeat.
The 58 Constitutional Committee. The Berbers of the Sahara (the Tuareg) and
the Tebu appear to be divided over the boycott. The Tuareg's Supreme Council
appears to agree to taking part in the election, but the people of Obari say
the council represents only its own opinion and that the Berbers of Obari will
boycott the election until Article (30) is amended accordingly.
On the 20th of February 2014 voting was suspending in Obari
after a number of polling stations were attacked and set on fire by protesters.
As a result all other polling stations were closed for security reasons. However
the elections in Ghat and other Tuareg areas were completed without any issues.
Libya Herald said that it was reported that all 31 polling stations in Murzuk
were never opened due to Tebu protesters blocking roads leading to the polling
stations; and that "The
Tebus apparently objected to the fact that despite the boycott, Tebu candidates
could be elected by non-Tebu voters because the voting system allowed them to
do so". [www.Libya Herald, article: /2014/02/20/elections-in-obari-halted-after-polling-stations-attacked-71-stations-across-libya-closed-95-open/]
The election committee had announced that the elections in Obari, Murzuk,
Kufra
and Derna will be re-scheduled for the 26th of February 2014. Critics say the
government made no steps to ensure the security of such polling stations and
therefore there is no guarantee that the elections will be completed successfully,
they said.
On the 30th of September 2015
the Libyan Amazigh Congress was reported to have rejected the invitation of
the CDA to discuss the Berber issue in relation to the constitution [3], stating
the same reasons stated previously when the Berber congress boycotted
the 60 Committee, namely the Berbers' demand to amend Article (30) of the controversial
and unjust Constitutional Declaration imposed by the NTC on Libyan people
without a referendum and without discussion. The Tebu Youth Council
( مجلس شباب التبو ) has also accused the CDA of "racism" and
of violating the Constitutional Declaration by excluding the Tebu from the
so-called "work committee" ( استبعاد مكون التبو من عضوية لجنة العمل
بالهيئة). Please see CDA tab (above) for further information and a copy of
the leaked draft constitution.
The Reason The Berber Representatives Decided To Boycott The CDA Elections:
بالامازيغية - هشام احمادي - عضو المجلس الأعلى لأمازيغ ليبيا ... الى الرأي العام الامازيغي
Hisham Ehmadi, member of the Tamazight Supreme Council, clarifies the council's
position to the Berber people.
According to the above video, the Amazigh Council made sure the Imazighen
(the Berbers) do not participate in a historical deal which the
Arabs would like to legitimise in the constitution because, he adds, if the
Berbers do take place in such a project they would certainly lose their
rights and also the rights of the future generations. That is, the Amazigh
Council
believes boycotting the CDA's elections ensures preserving the Berbers' rights.
This is true because the principle of voting and passing the draft with a
majority of two-thirds-plus-one would guarantee the Arabs to exclude the Berbers
and the Tebu with ease; whereas if consensus is implemented instead of voting
then the matter would be different.
He also revealed
that they (the Amazigh Council) were offered incentives by regional and international
institutions and political parties to take part in the CDA's elections and
bless the legitimacy of the draft constitution but they refused. It was a big
achievement, he said, to make sure not to take part in such a project; despite
the futile attempts by some Berber mediators to negotiate between the GNA and
the Amazigh Council purely for personal reasons, he affirmed.
He also noted a few more important points (see GNA or ALT for
more on these), including the promising news that the Amazigh Council is currently
working to unite with the Berber Tuareg of the south in one congress or one
parliament. This is very important for the Berbers because despite both the
so-called "Amazigh" and
"The Tuareg" being Berbers somehow Libyan and international
media outlets refer to them as different ethnic groups, thereby reflecting
the shear ignorance prevalent regarding Berber
matters.
For the CDA to include the "Amazigh" and
the "Tuareg"
as two ethnic groups of Libya in its clumsy draft constitution is a fatal violation
that could only reflect "ignorance". The
Berbers need to appeal against enshrining in the constitution such racial discrimination
and instead demand the unification of the various Berber groups as one ethnic
group with full and equal rights given to others for granted.
See CDA (above) for more Berber constitutional
updates.
7 February 2016
Historical News: Algeria Officialises
Tamazight In The Constitution
Probably irrelevant to this page but of significant importance
to the Berbers of North Africa, the Algerian Parliament today,
Sunday the 7th of February 2016, has passed the draft revised constitution
to make Tamazight an "official" language in the Algerian constitution
[15].
The amended draft was passed by an overwhelming majority of 499 MPs, with
only 2 MPs voting against, and 16 abstained. The amended draft also
calls for the creation of an academy of experts to promote Tamazight. The proposed
changes were made public last month by the head of the presidential office
in this tube.
Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal said the constitutional revision that included
promoting Tamazight as an official language is "the crowning of the
political reforms" originally initiated by the president Abdelaziz
Bouteflika [16]. He also noted that the revised draft "will
help protect the country from political upheavals and threats to the national
security"
[17].
Let us hope the Arab Libyans see the light that made them speak the words
of "wisdom" and do what is right to save Libya's unity and national
security. Hitting a brick wall with your head, like Gaddafi had said, would
only damage your head. Let us hope the Arabs of Libya build the courage needed
to respect the persecuted Libyans in the same way they seek the same respect
for themselves. As for the UN, one can only say: shame on you.
Update June 2021
Tamazight Supreme Council Rejects Constitution & Constitutional Base Without Consensus
Tamazight Supreme Council of Libya rejects the constitutional project, the referendum, and the constitutional base without full consensus.
The council reiterated its position in that all the ethnic groups of Libya (Berbers, Tebu and Arabs) must agree via consensus on any constitution or constitutional base. It also calls for equal representation of Tamazight women.
Constitution Drafting Assembly CDA
Official website of the CDA: http://www.cdalibya.org (offline)
HNEC Members & Contact Information
On the 6th of October 2015 the CDA has finally announced its long-awaited
draft constitution. The copy available for download in this page
was published by Libyas Channel [1] on the 9th of October 2015. The
draft constitution is still pending discussion and
approval by the committee. The committee
met in Ghadames on the 11th of October 2015 to discuss the draft [6].
On the 30th of September 2015 the Libyan Amazigh
Congress was reported to have rejected the invitation of the CDA to
discuss the Berber issue in relation to the constitution, stating
the same reasons noted previously when the Berber congress boycotted
the 60 Committee – namely the Berbers' demand to amend Article (30) of
the controversial and unjust Constitutional Declaration imposed by the
NTC on the Libyan people without a referendum and without a discussion.
Once more, and like all the previous constitutions of the ousted
Libyan governments, this draft constitution at last revealed its
intention to keep the Berbers as before: deprived of any official
recognition in their own country. When the Berbers
protested shortly after the installation of the NTC, they were
told to be patient and wait for the final constitution. Four years
later the Berbers found themselves back in square one. Let us
hope that one day equality will be an essential pillar of Libyan
justice.
Likewise the CD of the NTC, the draft constitution of the CDA
does not say anything about the kind of scientific research the
Libyans are allowed to conduct. No information whatsoever regarding
this issue is found in the draft.
Berbers And Tebu Reject Constitution
Without Libyan Consensus
Berber and Tebu CDA members have declared their rejection of any draft constitution
that is not agreed on by the Libyan people.
They have also condemned
the exclusion and marginalisation of Berber and Tebu representatives from
the so-called UN's Libyan Political Dialogue [12].
They stated that this exclusion was reflected on the results of the CDA which
were disappointing and not fulfilling to their aspirations.
The Berber and Tebu members have also condemned the "racist announcement"
[11] of the UN's envoy to Libya, Mr. Kobler, who was reported to have said
"Libya
is an Arab country"
[9]. Without
a doubt such statement could only inflame the already charged atmosphere
the UN claims to defuse.
However, the strange thing about Libyan and foreign media outlets
is that they refer to the "Berbers" and
the "Tuareg" as two different ethnic groups when both are Berbers
(or Imazighen).
The Berber-Tebu declaration is signed by the following members
who boycotted the CDA:
Tebu:
Khaled Bubaker Wahli
Sanussi Hamid Wahli
Berbers:
Khayri Hamisi
Mhemmed Benthaleb
Ibrahim Allaq
Ali Aghali
List of Berber and Tebu members who boycotted the CDA.
All Libyan Languages Official
Draft Constitutional Suggestions Making All Libyan
Languages Official
The following draft constitutional suggestions include an article that makes
all Libyan languages official [14]. The suggestion is put forwards by the non-Arab
members of the CDA, who have later resigned or boycotted the CDA, as noted
above.
The proposal of the Berber and Tebu members of the CDA
The proposal (or recommendation) calls for all Libyan languages
to be
"official" and therefore equal before the law. However, the problem
with the Berber-Tebu proposal is that it makes "Tamazight"
and "Tuareg" as two different languages when in fact they are one
Language.
The proposal of the Arab members of the CDA
Still worse, the Arab members who suggested
to make these language "national" but not "official" have
even included
"Ghadamsi" language and "other languages" in Article (27).
This is like making "Trabelsi", "Mesrathi" and "Shergawi" as
three different languages when they are all one "Arabic" language.
On the 3rd of February 2016 the CDA announced its second draft constitution
[13]. The CDA said this draft will be the basis of all future
drafts. The draft will be submitted to the "office of the chairman"
for revision.
According to a number of sources the draft
harbours regional tendencies that may harm the unity of Libya, such as the
suggestion of Libya having three capital cities and three central banks;
while the suggestion that Libya is an "Arab" country
has already angered Berber and Tebu members who called for a constitution that
recognises all Libyans equally in every sense.
Article 3 of the second draft of February 2016, outlining the
three capital cities of Libya.
The three capital cities of
the so-called "Libyan Republic" are as follows:
Tripoli is the political capital,
Benghazi is the economic capital,
Sabha is the cultural & tourist capital.
Despite the fact that the Berbers
are the natives of Libya they were denied official recognition by all the
previously-imposed constitutions in the same way the latest "Arab-written"
draft continues
to delve deeper into denial and discrimination under the pretext of national
unity. (See what Algeria did, below, to safeguard its national unity.)
The federalist bloc in Cyrenaica has also rejected the second draft constitution,
stating that the attempt to make Benghazi the economic capital is a superficial
or "misleading" attempt to please the federalists; and that the draft
needs to provide guarantees that all the economic institutions of Libya be
moved to Cyrenaica accordingly.
The second draft shows signs of playing with words (in relation to
identity) in order to bypass the "thorn". Maybe one day Libya will
see proper freedom and democracy in which all Libyans are truly equal before
the law. Here is how the "identity" article has changed in the latest draft:
Article 2 of the second draft of 2016
Translation (by temehu.com):
"The Libyan Republic is part of the Arab nation, the Islamic world,
Africa and the basin of the White Mediterranean Sea; based on united
and diversified principles; and is proud of all its social, cultural and linguistic
components."
See below for the third draft of 2016 for how
this "word play"
continues to deny the Berbers the recognition and the "freedom"
they thought they fought for.
Historical News: Algeria Officialises
Tamazight In The Constitution
Probably irrelevant to this page but of significant importance
to the Berbers of North Africa, the Algerian Parliament today,
Sunday the 7th of February 2016, has passed the draft revised constitution
to make Tamazight an "official" language in the Algerian constitution
[15].
The amended draft was passed by an overwhelming majority of 499 MPs, with
only 2 MPs voting against, and 16 abstained. The amended draft also
calls for the creation of an academy of experts to promote Tamazight. The proposed
changes were made public last month by the head of the presidential office
in this tube.
Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal said the constitutional revision that included
promoting Tamazight as an official language is "the crowning of the
political reforms" originally initiated by the president Abdelaziz
Bouteflika [16]. He also noted that the revised draft "will
help protect the country from political upheavals and threats to the national
security"
[17].
Let us hope the Arab Libyans see the light that made them speak the words
of "wisdom" and do what is right to save Libya's unity and national
security. Hitting a brick wall with your head, like Gaddafi had said, would
only damage your head. Let us hope the Arabs of Libya build the courage needed
to respect the persecuted Libyans in the same way they seek the same respect
for themselves. As for the UN, one can only say: shame on you.
15 February 2016
Ali Altarhouni
Albayda Appeals Court had ruled that Ali Altarhouni
(the
former head of the CDA) was ineligible to head the CDA because
he was an American citizen.
19 April 2016
Third Draft Constitution: illegal draft
On the 19th of April 2016 yet another copy of the so-called "constitution" appeared
from the closed corridors of oppression. The copy was presented to the HoR
on the 26th of April 2016.
However, Albayda Appeals
Court had ruled that the latest draft is illegal due
to a number of violations committed by the committee. The first violation is
that the CDA (upon returning to Libya from Oman) amended the voting quorum
to render the Oman votes legal; and they did this because the meetings
in Oman (where the UN and the CDA met to dictate their agendas) were boycotted
by a number of CDA members and therefore the voting within the CDA
lacked the required quorum.
The required quorum is "two-thirds
plus one of the total elected members", which was changed by the
CDA (in Oman and under the supervision of the UN) to "fifty percent
plus one of the attendees"
- note the change of "elected members" to "attendees",
which indicates some kind of "dodgy activity" to dictate a certain
ideology regardless of the number of boycotting elected members. Why (on
earth) should the CDA meet in Oman? What is wrong with Libya? And why Oman
in particular and not Honolulu? Most of the boycotting members, as reported
in this page, are of Berber and Tebu origin - the persecuted natives of Libya.
Another reported violation was that the CDA did not consult with the HoR before
presenting the draft constitution for referendum as stated by
Article 51 of the UN-violated LPA. Here is a copy of the article:
"Article (51)
The Constitution Drafting Assembly will take the opinion of
the House of Representatives and the State Council on the draft constitution
upon the completion of the final draft and before it is sent for referendum.
The remarks of such bodies must be sent in writing to the Assembly within one
month of them receiving the draft constitution."
The CDA had also violated Article 52 of the LPA, which stipulates that the
work of the CDA should not continue after the 24th of March 2016.
Yet the draft was presented to the HoR in late April 2016, and (as of today:
August 2016) the CDA still in operation!
"Article (52)
The work of the Constitution Drafting Assembly shall continue
until a date no later than 24 March 2016. In case the Assembly is not
able to conclude its mission by that date, a committee consisting of
five representatives from each of the House of Representatives and the
State Council with the participation of the Presidency Council of the
Council of Ministers, shall be formed at a date that does not exceed
two weeks of that date to deliberate regarding this matter."
This means that according to the boycotting members, and according
to the LPA, the CDA has no legitimacy to continue after the 24th of March 2016,
and therefore the draft constitution is nothing but ink on paper. Even the
controversial Constitutional Declaration (imposed by the NTC) states that the
work of the CDA shall not continue after 120 days after its first meeting.
Nonetheless, this [illegal] draft continues to play with words and identities
to please certain ideologies in which Libya continues to impose the Arab identity
as the only official identity in Libya (with the supervision of the UN in Oman,
of course). The identity Article 2 of the second draft, as shown above, was
changed, yet again, as follows:
Article 2 of third draft of 2016
The following is temehu.com's translation:
"The Libyan Identity is based on united and diversified
principles; the Libyans are proud of all their social, cultural, and linguistic
components; and Libya is considered part of the Arab nation, Africa, the
Islamic world and the basin of the White Mediterranean Sea. The
Languages spoken by the Libyans or part of them including Arabic, Amazigh,
Targi and Tebu are considered a cultural and linguistic heritage and a common
asset for all Libyans; the state shall guarantee all the necessary measures
to protect them and preserve their originality and develop their teaching and
usage to those who speak them. Arabic is the language
of the State. The law shall organise in the first parliamentary term
the details to integrate the other languages in the fields of
public life on the local level and on the state level."
The strange thing about the above article is that it lists the languages of
the Sahara's Berbers (Targi) and the other Berbers (Amazigh) as two different
languages when everyone knows that both are Berber languages (Tamazight).
In fact the Tuareg call their language "Tamasheght" and the other
Berbers call their language "Tamazight", both of which are the same
- masculinised by fake Berberists as "Amazigh".
Why is there the
tendency (from international media as well) to separate between the different
Berber groups and present them as separate ethnic minorities? Is it because
the Berbers occupy nearly half of Africa where uniting them would create more
problems for the Arab regimes than they could (for the time being) handle?
The article also uses the term "including" (including Arabic,
Amazigh, Targi, Tebu), which indicates there are other languages spoken
in Libya but which the article fails to name. The farce continues.
Did The The CDA Present Its Draft Constitution To
The Dialogue Team ?
It was widely reported by the media that
the CDA had revealed its final draft constitution during their meeting with
the members of the Libyan Dialogue team in Tunis (16-19 July 2016). However
some members of the CDA were shocked by the media's strange circulation of
such false news, and, according to Benghazi's LANA, the CDA made no such announcement
and no draft constitution was presented to the dialogue team [18] .
A copy of the article is saved here.
3 August 2016
17 CDA Members Reject The Third Draft Constitution
It was reported that seventeen members from the CDA had
rejected the results of the CDA including the third draft constitution,
and thus requested from the HoR to return the proposed
draft back to the CDA.
(This last request is illegal because, as noted above, the CDA no
longer exists after the 24th of March 2016).
They have also condemned the
actions of the UN regarding this matter, accusing the UN of hindering and delaying
the work of the CDA [21]. These 17 members are as follows:
The 17 CDA members who rejected the latest draft constitution.
See above for
a list of names of the Berber and Tebu boycotting members.
5 August 2016 Update
The HoR Will Discuss The Proposed Draft Constitution
The HoR will meet on the 8th of August 2016 to discuss the proposed draft
constitution [20].
29 July 2017 Update
Final Draft: The CDA Regurgitates Its Final Draft
Constitution
On the 29th of July 2017 the CDA had once more shocked the Libyans by dramatically
voting their final draft constitution without reaching consensus with neither
all the CDA's members nor with the two ethnic groups of Libya: the Tebu and
the Berbers (the Berber Amazigh and the Berber Tuareg). Out of 60 CDA members
only 43 members voted for the proposed draft (out of 44 attendees) and one
voted against.
After arguing and discussing the various proposals for a number of years the
CDA suddenly made its decision shortly after the agreement struck between
Haftar and Sarraj in Paris, which included holding presidential elections in
March 2018.
Since the presidential elections cannot take place without
a final constitution the CDA appears to have had no option but to hurry with
its draft on the 29th of July 2017.
Two days later the CDA informed the
HNEC to prepare for a referendum on the proposed draft constitution [27]. The
HNEC needs the HoR to prepare a special law to oversee the process before it
can prepare the referendum.
The HNEC has 30 days (starting from the 29th of
July 2017) to prepare such a referendum. Some fear the HoR could delay the
process beyond this date, especially since the
draft has not been approved by neither the Berber nor the Tebu members of the
CDA.
Once the proposed draft had been approved by two-thirds of the Libyan
population the HNEC has 180 days to prepare for the elections to the Senate
and House of Representatives.
If less than two-thirds of the population approve
the draft then the draft must go back to the drawing board to restart the whole shoddy process allover again.
The GNA's president had welcomed the
flawed draft and said nothing about any of the above violations [25]. The HoR
so far is silent about the matter, even though many HoR members have "personally"
rejected the draft. The Tebu members of the CDA had also rejected the draft
[24]. The Amazigh Supreme Council was reported to have said that it will take
the CDA to court over the proposed draft as well as write its own Berber constitution.
On the 10th of August 2017 the CDA's president, Mr. Nouh Abdulsayyed, sent
a letter to the HoR urging the parliament
to issue a referendum law as soon as possible so that the Libyans can vote
for the
draft constitution [29].
The final draft was widely criticised
for a number of reasons, the most important of which are:
Legality of the CDA: the CDA itself is an illegal institution because its validity
had expired in October 2015 and therefore it has no official authorisation
to propose anything. To this, the CDA replied [22] saying most other institutions,
like the HoR, had also expired, and therefore the CDA admits (indirectly)
that its authority had expired.
Legality of the Draft Constitution: according
to Dr. Ibtisam Bhih, a member of the CDA ( ابتسام بحيح - عضوة الهيئة التأسيسية
لصياغة الدستور ) the whole draft is illegal because when the CDA members
decided to vote whether to vote for the whole draft as "one bundle" (as
opposed to voting over individual chapters [chapter by chapter]) only 39
members voted for voting for the whole draft in one go, and this, she says,
is less than the required 41 votes, and thus the whole draft constitution
is illegal [31]. The second violation, according to Dr. Ibtisam, is that
the second session (the session in which 43 voted for the draft and one voted
against) began by reading the chapters of the draft to vote for as one bundle
despite the fact that this did not secure the required 41 votes in the earlier
session (Session 43). She also noted that this second session (Session 73)
was never closed because the voting was never finalised and stopped at vote
42 and thus it was not stated who did vote against
the draft [31, starting at 1:01:10 of the video]. In fact she said she was
not personally asked if she approves or rejects the draft constitution and
therefore "my voice was lost", she said. The draft itself
(click
here for a copy)
confirms this because it lists the names of those who voted
for the draft but it does not say who voted against it (see the end
of the draft constitution). In response to Dr. Ibtisam's revelations, Mr. Abulqasem
Basheer, a member of the CDA, said the internal regulations were amended
on that day where the required 41 votes were amended to "half plus one"
(which he says is 21 votes, which is far less than 39). He also said Dr.
Ibtisam left the hall when the hall was invaded by protesters and therefore
she was not present in the end. Dr. Ibtisam responded by stating that the
final draft constitution requires two-thirds-plus-one and therefore 41 votes
are required. Changing or amending this regulation on the final day (just
one hour before the final vote) indicates that they (the CDA members) can
change the law according to what they see fit. In short, the voting procedure
was wholly unprofessional with confusing reports of armed men attacking the
hall, and the president of the CDA calling for a second vote on Sunday (the
following day). [Update:
on the 16th of August the Appeal Court has ruled that the CDA's vote is invalid
and also stopped the decision to refer the draft constitution to the House
of Representatives because of a number of violations including this one.
See Referendum Tab for details.]
Saturday: the voting over the final draft occurred
on Saturday the 29th of July 2017, which is a holiday and therefore, critics
say, the voting is illegal [31]. [Update: on the 16th of
August the Appeal Court has ruled that the CDA's vote is invalid
and also stopped the decision to refer the draft
constitution to the House of Representatives because of a number of violations
including this one. See Referendum Tab for details.]
Arab: some Libyans say they are not happy with
the name of the country, namely "The
Libyan Republic",
because it does not include the word "Arab". While non-Arab Libyans
say the draft constitution expresses a fundamental Arab attitude towards
the natives of Libya and attempts to impose "Arabism" – the false
notion that Libya is an Arab country – even though no such direct term was
used, and instead it was rather implied indirectly by stating that Libya
is "part
of the Arab world" – probably an attempt to play with words
in order to please the natives. [In fact the draft
carries on stating that Libya is
part of Africa and part of the Mediterranean Basin, and presumably part of
planet Earth in the Solar System in the Milky Way, not far from "The
Great Attractor" in
this visible Universe!]
Ethnicity: the draft constitution lists
the so-called "Amazigh" (the
Berbers of the north) and "The Tuareg" (the Berbers of the
south) as being two separate ethnic groups when in fact they are both Berbers
belonging to the same Imazighen nation of North Africa. The
Tuareg call themselves "Imushagh" and speak "Tamasheght"
which is the same as Tamazight the Amazigh speak. The Berbers of Libya
should strongly object to this discrimination being enshrined in the constitution
and instead request the
unification of both tribes as members of the same ethnic group - namely the
Imazighen ('The Berbers'). There are more than 40 major Berber tribal
groups still inhabiting North Africa to-day including the Imushagh group
of the Great Sahara (which foreigners call "Tuareg").
Unjust Law: ethnic groups were excluded from the democratic process by
stipulating conditions they knew the natives would not accept to begin with,
like voting on matters that should be decided by agreement. The Berbers say
basic human rights should be enshrined in the constitution and should not
be subjected to a referendum in which the majority Arabs can easily reject. This
means that those who wrote both (the CD and the election laws [including
those of the GNC elections]) knew such unjust conditions would trigger the
revolt of the ethnic groups. The Berbers objected then(and hence the boycott
of both the elections of the HoR and the CDA) but to no avail - the majority
dictate, as usual, what they see fit: "tyranny" with an international
backing.
Berber : Tamazight languages
are not, once more, official languages of the Arab Islamic State.
Tebu: Tebu language is not, once more, an official
language of the Arab Islamic State.
Religion: not recognising other religions
could be considered discriminatory on religious grounds, since Article 6
declares Libya an Islamic State, while Articles 69 and 99 state that only
Muslims can become members of the parliament (the Council and the Senate).
Contradiction: many critics say Article 192 contradicts
Article 99. Article 192 states that those with dual citizenship and those
who acquired another nationality cannot assume sovereign functions.
This prohibits the president, the ministers, and all MPs and other government
employees from assuming any functions in Libya if they have another nationality
(without any conditions specified). While Article 99 (clause 2) states that
to run for presidency (which is a sovereign function) one must had not acquired
another nationality unless this nationality had been renounced at least a
year before candidacy. Some CDA members [see reference 31] tried to explain
this contradiction by stating that Article 192 applies to foreigners who
acquired a Libyan nationality, while Article 99 applies to Libyans who acquired
a foreign nationality; but this explanation is not clear by the wording of
these Articles and therefore even though this may have been the intention
of the CDA it is not what is written in the constitution. The wording of
these two articles needs to change to reflect the implied meaning in order
to avoid the clear contradiction. Unless, of course, the contradiction (like
many elsewhere) are there for other reasons!
Consensus: no consensus was reached. According
to the law passed by the GNC the draft constitution has to be approved by
the Berber and Tebu members of the CDA, in addition to the two-thirds-plus-one
of the CDA members. When the
CDA's president Mr. Nouh Abdulsayyed (نوح عبد السيد المغربي رئيس الهيئة التأسيسية
لصياغة الدستور) was asked about this, his reply was that the Berbers of the
north (or the Amazigh) had boycotted the CDA's elections to start with and
therefore they have no rights in the matter [23]- that is they gave up their
rights, which sounds rather "childish" answer since this is no democracy
for which the whole of Libya was destroyed.
Flag & Anthem: this is the first time
in Libya's history the constitution does not define a flag and a national
anthem for Libya [28]. The flag was left for the (forthcoming) parliament
to decide, instead of enshrining the current flag (of the so-called revolution)
in the constitution; and therefore critics say when the president is elected
(with or without a constitution)
the president would have neither a flag nor an anthem for the presidential
ceremony.
The president and his elected parliament could then decide whatever they want; after all that is the definition of democracy: the government does what it wants and the people can say whatever they like: free speech.
Imagine a scenario where Gaddafi's loyalists win the
election (the election that will be organised in the current chaos ruled by outlaw militias), and then decide to reinstate the
green flag as the official flag of Libya and also reintroduce the Jamahiriya
anthem. The fact that the flag
and the anthem were left out from the current draft could indicate that the
authors of the draft have no intention of enshrining the current flag of the
revolution in the constitution! Either way it is not up to them to decide such matters
and therefore the Libyan people should reject the current draft solely based
on this single violation.
The constitutional draft must be complete, and should not have any holes that could lead to further trouble in the future.
Parliament Seats: the seats of the House of Representatives
have not been specified, as opposed to the seats of the Senate (78 members).
Freedom: vague limitations are also imposed on
freedom of expression and scientific research that might allow government
institutions to silence any undesired criticism or unwanted research.
Sharia Law: approving Sharia as the only
source of legislation without any specifications or further information
is considered by many Libyans to limit freedom according to the interpretations
and understanding
of Sharia. Such issues
ought to be clearly defined and specifically stated which school of Sharia
would be applied in order to avoid the danger of human rights being annulled
if future law-makers regard them as being in violation of Sharia. Article
159 states that the National Council for Human Rights shall promote human
rights found in Islamic Sharia and international conventions. It is not
known how any council can reconcile Sharia with international conventions. Moreover, Article 161 does state
that members of the Sharia Research Council can issue fatwas according
to the "dominant jurisprudential heritage", but does not
say what this heritage is. The use of "dominant" indicates
the existence of other heritages which thus would be ignored.
Restrictions: Article 195 of the draft prohibits
amending a number of articles including Articles 2 and 6. Article 2 marginalises
Tamazight and Tebu languages and therefore there is no future chance of any
kind of change regarding constitutionalising Tamazight and Tebu languages
as official languages of Libya; and Article 6 specifies Sharia as the only
source of legislation and
therefore this cannot be changed either.
Capital City: a team of activists, dignitaries
and elders from Benghazi met the
HoR's president on Saturday the 12th of August 2017, requesting the HoR rejects
the draft constitution because it does not represent the various components
of the Libyan society. They said they will not recognise any constitution
that does not make Benghazi a second capital city of Libya [30]. Article
3 of the second draft proposed in February 2016 did include three capital
cities for Libya: Tripoli as the political capital, Benghazi
as the economic capital, and Sabha as the cultural & tourist capital,
but the draft was rejected.
Conclusion: in short the CDA had failed to enshrine
the aspirations of the 17th of February Revolution which allegedly denounced
any form of tyranny and
called for freedom and equality - that is all Libyans (Arabs, Berbers and
Tebu) should be 100% equal before the law. This unconditional equality (in
practice) needs to be enshrined
in the constitution if the constitution to be regarded just and democratic;
otherwise replacing one tyranny with another has nothing to do with revolution,
freedom or equality. Who knows, maybe the "Arab Spring revolutions"
apply to Arabs only; in which case the Berbers need to await the Berber Spring,
and likewise the Tebu must wait for the Tebawi Spring.
Bayda's Court of Appeal Rules CDA's Vote Invalid
محكمة استئناف البيضاء قبلت الطعن في جلسة الهيئة الخاصة بإقرار
المسودة
Bayda's Court of
Appeal has accepted the appeal in the session of the CDA to approve the draft
constitution. The court has ruled that
the CDA's vote is invalid and also stopped the decision to refer the draft
constitution to the House of Representatives for formulating a referendum law.
See Referendum tab for more on this.
Tripoli's Supreme Court Ruled It Had No Jurisdiction
Over Appeals Filed Against
CDA
14 February 2018 Update
According to Libya's Channel and other media outlets the Supreme Court in Tripoli
has ruled that the administrative judiciary had no jurisdiction over the appeals filed
against the CDA. CDA's
member Nadia Omran has confirmed to Libya's Channel
that the matter now rests with the HoR to draft the referendum law so that
[some] Libyans can either accept or reject the proposed draft [32].
However, according to the CDA member Abdulhamid Jibril the media are misleading
the public because the Supreme Court had ruled against one appeal out of a
total of four appeals filed against the CDA, and that it is not clear which
one of these the court ruling relates to [33].
On the other hand, Nadia Omran said [33] that the court's ruling relates to
the appeal filed against the CDA in that the voting over the draft constitution
was carried out in a Saturday (which is a public holiday), and therefore its
ruling applies to all the other appeals in that it has no jurisdiction over
the CDA - whatever that means.
When she was asked who might have the jurisdiction to rule against the CDA she
gave no clear answer. This means that there is no one who has jurisdiction over
the decisions dictated by the CDA. This means
that the violations littering the draft will be endorsed if the leaders say
the Libyans had voted for the draft; thereby replacing one tyranny with another.
Tripoli's Supreme Court ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the appeals filed against the CDA.
قضت المحكمة العليا بطرابلس بعدم اختصاص القضاء الإداري في
الطعون المقدمة ضد الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة مشروع الدستور
مشروع الدستور وأزمة ليبيا .. إلى الاستفتاء أم الاستعصاء؟
14 August 2017 Update
HoR Refers Draft Constitution To The Legislative
Committee
On the 14th of August 2017 the HoR discussed the request and transferred
the issue to the "Legislative Committee" (اللجنة
التشريعية) to
prepare a law for the referendum (بإعداد قانون الاستفتاء
على مسودة مشروع الدستور). Critics say the number of MPs attended the
session was not enough to pass the request, but Mr. Ezeddin Gueireb (عز
الدين قويرب), a member of the HoR, confirmed to Libyas Channel that the
HoR discussed the matter legally and that ninety MPs attended the session
[1].
In relation to the rumours stating that the referendum law draft was
originally proposed by the CDA itself, Dr. Ibtisam Bhih (ابتسام بحيح
- عضوة الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة الدستور), a member of the CDA, confirmed
to Libyas Channel [1] that the draft referendum law was originally proposed
on the 16th of April 2016 by a 3-members committee from within the CDA
and in participation with the HNEC and the HoR.
She also revealed that
the draft law was kept secret and that ever since they (those who opposed
the draft proposal) tried to see this draft but to no avail because there
was a clear silence regarding both: the purposed draft constitution and
the proposed referendum law. She categorically stated that she and other
members requested from the CDA to allow them access to the proposed referendum
law but their request was denied and that to this day many members never
saw the draft referendum law.
Apparently the "proposed law" was presented to the
HoR for confirmation, but the HoR was also completely silent regarding
this matter. However, Mr. Ezeddin Gueireb did confirm [1] that
the legislative committee had indeed received two referendum law projects:
one from the CDA and the other from the HNEC. To this Dr. Ibtisam Bhih
(ابتسام بحيح) replied that it is incorrect to say that the CDA had presented
a project to the HoR because we (most members of the CDA) had no knowledge
of such project. She also said it would have been wiser if Mr. Gueireb
instead said "some members of the CDA"
had presented a referendum law project to the HoR.
When Mr. Omar Alneaas (عمر النعاس - عضو الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة الدستور)
was asked to confirm if the CDA did present the HoR with its "referendum
law project", he tried repeatedly to avoid a direct answer and instead
he insisted that it was not a law or a project but just "a proposal" put
forward by some members of the CDA and that anyone can propose anything.
This is very strange answer because logic states that it would be essential
that all the members of the CDA should first talk together about any
proposals and then agree on a final draft to present to the HoR. For
a few members to prepare "whatever" in secret and present it to the HoR
is a clear that there is something going on.
According to Dr. Ibtisam Bhih the 3 members of this CDA referendum law
committee are:
Mr Mhemmed Habib (from Fezzan )
Mr. Omar Alneaas (Cyrenaica)
Dr. Alhadi Muhadra (Tripolitania)
The committee held their sessions in Tunisia, she said. This indicates
that there is a secret bloc or organisation within the CDA and HNEC that
is working independently of the rest of the members of the CDA and the
HNEC.
To complicate matters worse, Mr. Abulqasem Basheer, also a CDA
member (ابوالقاسم بشير يوشع), reveals
that the Tunisia meeting of the 3-member committee was nothing more than
a consultation meeting, but he never saw the draft referendum law [1].
He also stated that a referendum law is not
required because the HNEC, he said, had earlier stated that once
the draft constitution is ready "it can be put"
to referendum without stating that a law is required.
Mr. Basheer said if it was put by law then the HoR can issue the law,
but if it was put by decree then even the GNA can issue the decree -
even the HNEC, he said, can do that. This is, again, very strange,
and, like everything else since February 2011, it is impossible to know
what is going on.
When the presenter asked Mr. Basheer if the HNEC never defined which
authority can create a referendum law (or decree) then how he (Mr. Basheer)
connected this with the GNA, his reply was that the CD (the NTC's constitutional
Declaration) did not specify which authority would organise the referendum
and therefore anyone can do that.
According to Mr. Ezeddin Gueireb Mr. Basheer's revelations are
not correct and that he rather prefers not to comment on such matters,
but when the presenter insisted he replied that Mr. Basheer's revelations
appear to have been designed to put pressure on the HoR in that if the
HoR does not issue the referendum law then they or anyone else can [1].
According to Dr. Ibtisam Bhih (a member of the CDA herself) Mr.
Basheer's revelations are not correct.
16 August 2017 Update
Bayda's Court of Appeal Rules CDA's Vote Invalid
استئناف البيضاء توقف قرار إحالة مسودة الدستور إلى مجلس النواب
Dr. Abdul Hamid Jibril, amember of the constituent body of the Department
of Cyrene, was reported to have said on Wednesday that the Bayda's Court
of Appeal has accepted the appeal in the session of the CDA to approve
the draft constitution (محكمة استئناف البيضاء قبلت الطعن في جلسة الهيئة
الخاصة بإقرار المسودة). Mr. Jibril said the court has ruled that the
CDA's vote is invalid and therefore the court has ordered to stop
the decision to refer the draft constitution to the House of Representatives
[2].
Libyas Channel said on the following day that the court decision was
based on the fact that the CDA had violated the internal regulations
when voting for the draft,
and also the voting occurred on Saturday the 29th of July 2017 which
is an official holiday [5]. Reportedly the voting procedure
was wholly unprofessional with confusing reports of armed men attacking
the hall, and the president of the CDA calling for a second vote on Sunday
(the following day) [6].
On the following day, Mr. Z. Dghim, a member of the House of Representatives,
was reported to have said that after this victory "we have no constitution
project to refer to the HNEC with a referendum law":
"بهذا الحكم لم يعد لدينا مشروع دستور لنحيله للمفوضية صحبة قانون
استفتاء . . . موضحًا أن قبول الطعن بالشق المستعجل
دلالة لوجاهة الطعون، وبالتالي فالحكم النهائي مضمون . . . " [3].
On the other hand, Badri Alsharif, a member of the CDA, said they will
challenge the decision of the Bayda court by appealing to
the Supreme Court:
(هذا الحكم سيتم الطعن فيه أمام المحكمة العليا)
[4].
He said the CDA is confident the Supreme Court will be on their
side.
18 August 2017 Update
حكم استئناف البيضاء: إعادة لصياغة السطور أم نهاية لهيئة الدستور؟
إعادة لصياغة السطور
أم نهاية لهيئة الدستور؟
Among the speakers in the above discussion is Mr. Ahmed Qunsel, the
member of the CDA who challenged the CDA's vote (أحمد علوان القنصل
- عضو الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة الدستور). Apparently the Bayda's Court
of Appeal made its decision in response to Mr. Qunsel's challenge. According
to Mr. Qunsel there are a number of reasons for his challenge, some of
which he cannot disclose because they contain "names of persons".
However,
Dr. Abdulhamid Jibril (عبد الحميد جبريل - عضو الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة
الدستور) said there are two more challenges on their way to other courts
(other than the Bayda's Court of Appeal); one of which calls for cancellation
of the draft constitution in its entirety.
Nonetheless, Mr. Qunsel disclosed two reasons for his challenge: the
first is that the internal regulations of the CDA were not followed during
the session in that the members need to discuss the articles of the draft
and add any notes or corrections; then agree on the method of voting
(chapter by chapter or as a bundle); then vote over the draft. Even the
voting itself, he said, was violated.
The second reason is that
the decision was made on Saturday which is a holiday. He said he was
recalled by his constituency for consultation over the draft (that is
in Zawiya) and that he was not present during the voting because it was
a holiday. Sessions can be held, he added, on public holidays but these
are called "consultative sessions"
in which no decisions shall be made or taken. He also stated that he
was not notified about the voting session.
On the other hand, Mr. Emrajea' Nouh, a member of the CDA ( إمراجع نوح
- عضو الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة الدستور) said there is no law barring them
from working on Saturdays, and that Decree 489 of 2005 (issued by Gaddafi's
GPC), which made Saturday a holiday, was automatically cancelled by Law
17 (of 2013), which allowed the CDA the right to define its working days.
But in response to this, Dr. Jibril noted that Article 46 of Law 17 (of 2013)
clearly states that the CDA must formulate its internal regulations and that
Article 10 (under Clause 8) of the internal regulations states that the CDA
must define the days of the week in which they can work (work-days)
and the days in which they cannot work
(holidays or rest-days); and that according to Article 12 the CDA must issue
a decree deciding these work days for the members of the CDA. This, Dr. Jibril
said, was never done. The CDA never decided such days and therefore the CDA
is in violation of its internal regulations.
Thus, Dr. Jibril asked, if the
CDA is incapable of respecting their own regulations how could they be able
to write a constitution for the whole country?
7 September 2017 Update
Sarraj Warns HoR
Sarraj tells the HoR: there are other alternatives to
pass the referendum law! If the HoR does not perform its duty during
this difficult period then there are other alternatives, such as the
judicial authority, he says, to impose
the referendum law. This means that the current draft constitution
(with all its violations and defects) can be imposed on the Libyan people
in the name of rescuing the country from the imposed chaos. Mr. Sarraj
said nothing about any of the violations littering
the proposed draft constitution. Are we inching closer to
dividing
Libya than ever before?
13 September 2017
Legality of Sarraj Bypassing The Parliament
Stolen Democracy: السراج ومقترح تجاوز البرلمان إلى الإنتخابات
Sarraj to bypass the parliament regarding presidential
elections!
24 September 2018
Draft Referendum Law: مجلس النواب يقر قانون الاستفتاء وتعديل الإعلان الدستوري
Finally the HoR publishes a draft referendum law for the permanent constitution [11]. The delay in passing the draft law was due to disagreement regarding Article 65 of the draft law which divides Libya into three polling centres when the Constitutional Declaration (CD) states that there could be only one polling centre.
Therefore in order to pass the law the HoR had to amend Article 30 of the temporary CD that was imposed by the NTC in 2011. The latest constitutional amendment (CD Amendment 10) divides Libya into three polling centres (Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan), where the numbers of votes required should be 50%+1 of voters for each region with the overall percentage be no less than two-thirds of the total votes (مشروع الدستور يجب أن يتحصل على 50%+1 من أصوات المقترعين في كل دائرة وثلثي المقترعين في الدوائر مجتمعة).
In effect this latest amendment by the HoR divides Libya into three regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan), as opposed to the one country stipulated by the CD; and therefore the first official indication that Libya may well be divided into three countries in years to come. The HoR has passed this draft law to the HNEC for consideration on the 26th of September 2018 [12].
However, as usual, there are those critics who say the law was passed in violation of the internal regulations because apparently signatures were collected for the vote on the draft law from HoR members who were not present at the time of passing the law. Allegedly the law was approval by over 135 HoR members, but the number of the HoR members who were present was far less than that.
The Head of the HNEC, Mr. Imad Assayeh, said that the referendum law is vague [13].
The HoR's official website provides no details about this decision. Here is a snapshot of the actual announcement [14]
The Berber activists have already boycotted the referendum on Libya's constitution in July 2018. The Libyan Tamazight Supreme Council had also rejected the outcome of the forthcoming referendum stating that the constitution is "racist and unjust". They have also blamed the UN, CDA, HoR and HCS for the imposed segregation. On the 30th of September 2018 the Berber activists reiterated their earlier request which calls for the Berbers' rights to be included in the constitution without the need for voting because human rights cannot be voted for [15]; they must be implemented by law, the Berbers say.
Libya is for Libyans, and the so-called revolution is for all Libyans. For a particular group of Libyans to run away with the revolution under international supervision, then turn round and say, well, the ethnic minorities need to be included in the dialogue is a complete farce, simply because Libya is for "all Libyans" and there is nothing else to include or exclude. You can include non-Libyans in the dialogue, as they have already included Tunisians, Egyptians, Turks, Italians, Americans, English, other Arabs, other Africans and so many other nationalities over the past ten years. But to include Libyans in Libyans makes no sense at all.
27 November 2018
Referendum Law 6 of 2018 (قانون رقم 6 لسنة 2018 بشأن الاستفتاء على الدستور)
The following is a copy of Rreferendum Law 6 (of 2018) as published by the HoR on Wednesday the 27th of November 2018. The law itself carries the date: 27 of November 2018. The law consists of 45 Articles. The HoR had also to amend the CD in order to pass this law. Article 6 of the law divides Libya into three voting districts, while the CD recognises only one voting distric in Libya. CD amendment 10 divides Libya into three voting districts.
LNA's Spokesman Calls For Elections Without Constitution
11 October 2018
المسماري : سنذهب إلى الانتخابات إذا رفض الشعب الدستور
The spokesman of the armed forces in Cyrenaica says they will go for the elections even if the people of Libya rejected the draft constitution. According to the persecuted Libyan native minorities the proposed draft is a fascist constitution that should be rejected outright. Constitutional rights cannot be voted for but should be enshrined by the constitution via consensus.
The same decision was made over two years later by the JCC in Egypt: see next:
JCC Decides To Hold Elections In December 2021 Without Constitution
13 February 2021
Sabah Joumaa (HoR member)
The Joint Constitution Committee (JCC) had agreed on the 13th of February 2021 that if the constitutional referendum fails, and after the HoR confirms that the referendum cannot take place, then the 24 December 2021 elections will go ahead as planed without the constitution but based on the so-called "constitutional base" ( القاعدة الدستورية ) - whatever that means. Apparently the JCC agreed, according to HoR member Sabah Joma'a (صباح جمعة النائبة) [10], that the constitutional referendum will take place after the presidential elections.
This confirm the old rumours that the leaders had no intention of agreeing a final constitution and hence their failure to do so for the pat 10 long years. This is exactly what many feared in 2017 when the draft attracted major criticism from various legal institutions and Berber and Tebu leaders. The criticism was that the current leaders have a hidden agenda to elect a president and a final government without a constitution, so that the elected government and the president then can decide on some contested issues without the constitution, like the flag, which was undefined by the 2017 draft constitution.
Conspiracy or Not! آلية جديدة لاعتماد القاعدة الدستورية . . . هل هي مؤامرة لعدم إجراء الانتخابات؟
Libyan transitional leaders do not want to leave their places by delaying referendum and elections.
آلية جديدة لاعتماد القاعدة الدستورية . . . هل هي مؤامرة لعدم إجراء الانتخابات؟
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFlkXnH-wrc
HNEC Says JCC Results Are Not What Expected
The head of the HNEC, Mr. Emad Sayeh, was reported by Libya's Channel to have said that the results of the JCC in Egypt are not what they expected, onscure, and not clear; adding that the committee's statement made no reference to the 24th of December 2021 elections, it was not signed, and has no reference to Article 4.
He also said that the 24th of December 2021 are not for the final government of stability, but for "a 4th transitional period".
HNEC's general manager says passing the constitution hampers elections.
